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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The district court erred in denying Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress and abused 
its discretion at sentencing.  The district court denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress 
because it concluded Mr. Bonilla consented to a frisk for weapons and the officer who 
conducted the frisk did not exceed the scope of his consent, or of a permissible frisk 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), when he lifted up Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without 
first conducting a pat down of his clothing.  The State contends the district court did not 
err in its ruling and also argues the evidence found in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle should not 
have been suppressed because it was supported by independent probable cause based 
on a drug dog’s alert on Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle.  The State did not meet its burden of 
proving in the district court the applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement and the record is not sufficient for this Court to apply this exception in the 
first instance.  This Court should reverse the district court’s order denying Mr. Bonilla’s 
motion to suppress.  Alternatively, this Court should conclude the district court abused 
its discretion at sentencing.      
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Bonilla included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his 





1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Bonilla to a 
unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, for possession with intent to 
deliver, and for five years, with two years fixed, for unlawful possession of a 







The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bonilla’s Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Officer Reimers Exceeded The Scope Of Mr. Bonilla’s Consent, And Exceeded 
The Scope Of A Terry Frisk, When He Lifted Up Mr. Bonilla’s T-Shirt Without 
First Conducting A Pat Down Of His Clothing 
 
Mr. Bonilla argued in his opening brief that Officer Reimers exceeded the scope 
of his consent, and the scope of a permissible frisk under Terry, when he lifted up 
Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without first conducting a pat down of his clothing.  (App. Br., pp.8-
11.)  The State argues the frisk was permissible because the officer’s act of lifting up 
Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt was a reasonable way to search for weapons under the 
circumstances.  (Resp. Br., pp.10-15.)  The State’s argument is based on an incorrect 
interpretation of Terry and its progeny and must be rejected.  Where, as here, a search 
is based on consent, “the State must conform its search to the limitations placed upon 
the right granted by the consent.”  State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 2012).  
Officer Reimers did not conform his search to the limitations placed upon it, which was a 
Terry frisk, and the search thus violated Mr. Bonilla’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court defined a frisk as “a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing.”  392 U.S. at 30.  Our courts have “repeatedly reiterated 
that under Terry, a protective frisk is generally limited to a pat-down of the outer 
clothing.”  Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627.  The State argues in its brief that any limited 
intrusion designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault is 
permissible under Terry.  (Resp. Br., p.13.)  The Court of Appeals rejected this exact 
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same argument in Tyler.  See Tyler, 153 Idaho at 628 (rejecting the State’s argument 
that “the standard under Terry is merely whether the search was confined in scope to an 
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden 
instruments for the assault of the police officer”) (quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
of Appeals explained in Tyler that this standard failed to “take into consideration the 
privacy interests of the person being searched” and “would provide virtually no limit to 
the scope of a frisk for weapons.”  Id.  
In Tyler, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s 
motion to suppress, recognizing “the officer did not first attempt a pat-down of [the 
defendant’s] outer clothing . . . which may have provided the basis for an additional 
intrusion depending on what the officer felt.”  Id. at 628-29.  This is consistent with case 
law from other jurisdictions holding “[a]n actual search of a person’s body is not 
authorized under Terry until after a pat down confirms the presence of a weapon or 
contraband.”  United States v. Aquino, 674 F.3d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing 
cases from the Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits).  Here, the State did not meet its 
burden of demonstrating the particular factual circumstances justified any intrusion 
beyond a pat-down of Mr. Bonilla’s clothing, which Officer Reimers never conducted.  
This was the basis for the district court’s order denying Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress, 






B. The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving In The District Court The 
Applicability Of The Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement And The 
Record Is Not Sufficient For This Court To Apply This Exception In The First 
Instance  
 
Mr. Bonilla argued in his opening brief that all of the evidence discovered 
subsequent to Officer Reimers’ discovery of marijuana in his pocket during the so-called 
frisk stemmed from the frisk and should have been suppressed.  (App. Br., p.12.)  The 
State argues in its brief that even if the frisk was unlawful, the evidence discovered in 
Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle should not have been suppressed because the search of the 
vehicle was supported by independent probable cause—specifically, the drug dog’s 
alert on Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle—and the search thus fell within the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement.  (Resp. Br., pp.5-11.) 
Mr. Bonilla anticipated the State would make this argument and thus, in his 
opening brief, argued the drug dog’s alert did not provide an independent basis for the 
discovery of the evidence found in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle because, first, the State did not 
meet its burden of demonstrating the seizure of Mr. Bonilla was sufficiently limited in 
scope and duration; and, second, the drug dog’s entry into Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was 
facilitated by law enforcement and was not instinctual.  (App. Br., pp.12-14.)  In order to 
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the State has the burden of proving 
a warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981).  The State did not meet its burden of 
proving the search of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was supported by independent probable 
cause based on the drug dog’s alert.   
The district court did not make any findings or conclusions regarding whether the 
traffic citation would have been issued to Mr. Bonilla, and the purpose of the stop 
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completed, prior to the deployment of the drug dog and absent the unlawful frisk.  
Without such findings or conclusions, this Court should not decide in the first instance 
that the traffic stop would not have been extended absent the illegal frisk.  
The district court also did not make any findings or conclusions regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the dog’s entry into the open door of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle.  
The State asserts in its brief that Mr. Bonilla “apparently failed to shut the vehicle’s door” 
but the State did not present any evidence in the district court to support this claim.  
Officer Reimers testified at the preliminary hearing that he deployed his drug dog 
around Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle after he placed him under arrest, beginning at the front 
license plate and proceeding counterclockwise, and the dog jumped into the vehicle 
through the open driver’s side, and alerted after jumping in the vehicle.  (6/17/15 Tr., 
p.10, Ls.6-14.)  The State did not present any evidence regarding the reason the door 
was open, including whether the dog was leashed at the time it was deployed, which 
would be critical in determining whether the dog’s entry into the vehicle was instinctual 
or facilitated.  Compare State v. Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258, 259-61 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(concluding dog’s entry into vehicle was instinctual, not facilitated, where defendant “left 
his driver’s side window open” and the dog “spontaneously moved his head up to the 
open window” when the officer directed the dog to sniff at the door’s seam) with United 
States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding dog’s entry 
into vehicle was facilitated search where police opened van door, unleashed dog as he 
neared the door, and dog entered the van). 
This Court is not in a position to make factual findings on whether the stop would 
have been extended absent the illegal frisk and whether the dog’s entry into 
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Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was facilitated or instinctual.  If the State wanted to rely on the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it was the State’s responsibility to 
introduce sufficient evidence in the district court to support this exception.  The State did 
not do so.  The district court denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress because it 
concluded Mr. Bonilla consented to a frisk for weapons, and the search conducted by 
Officer Reimers did not exceed the scope of a Terry frisk.  (10/8/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21; 
R., pp.100-09.)  As discussed above, the district court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding Officer Reimers did not exceed the scope of Mr. Bonilla’s consent and of a 
permissible Terry frisk when he lifted Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without first patting down his 
clothing.   
 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Bonilla To A Unified 
Term Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Possession With Intent To Deliver, And 
For Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm, To Be 
Served Concurrently 
 
On this issue, Mr. Bonilla relies on the argument contained in his opening brief.  




For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief, 
Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district 
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings.  Alternatively, if this Court finds no error in the district court’s 
order denying his motion to suppress, Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or vacate his sentences and remand this 
case to the district court for resentencing.   
 DATED this 14th day of November, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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